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Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the
Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz
Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski
If race-thinking were a German invention, as it has been sometimes asserted,
then “German thinking” (whatever that may be) was victorious in many parts




ISTORIANS on both sides of the Atlantic are currently engaged in a con-
troversy about the allegedly genocidal nature of western colonialism
and its connections with the mass violence unleashed by Nazi
Germany between 1939 and 1945. The debate touches upon some of the
most “sensitive” issues of twentieth-century history: the violent “dark side”
of modern western civilization, the impact of colonial massacres on the Euro-
pean societies that generated this violence and, perhaps most controversially,
the origins and uniqueness of the Holocaust.
Following the (not entirely dissimilar) controversy about the violent legacy
of Communism and its relationship to Nazi atrocities, which was triggered by
publications such as Ernst Nolte’s “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will,”2
Franc¸ois Furet’s Le passe´ d’une illusion,3 and Ste´phane Courtois’s Livre noir du
communisme,4 the current “colonial turn” in historiography is posing yet
another challenge to the Holocaust’s long-standing “narrative monopoly” on
extreme mass violence.5 Convinced that the idea of the Holocaust’s “unique-
ness” or “singularity” has too long overshadowed “lesser,” “marginal,” or
“incomplete” genocides in various colonial contexts (from Australia, Asia, and
The authors would like to thank the numerous readers of preliminary versions of this article for
their constructive criticism and the Guggenheim Foundation and the British Academy for their
financial support which enabled us to write this essay.
1Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt, 1973), 158.
2Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht
gehalten werden konnte,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986.
3Franc¸ois Furet, Le passe´ d’une illusion: Essai sur l’ide´e du communisme au XXe sie`cle (Paris: Laffont/
Calman-Le´vy, 1996).
4Ste´phane Courtois et al., Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, repression (Paris: Robert Laffont,
1997).
5Charles A. Maier, “Conseigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for
the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105 (2000): 807–831, here 825–829.
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Africa to Latin and North America), scholars such as Enzo Traverso, Sven
Lindquist, Dirk Moses, Mark Levene, and Dan Stone have recently offered
challenging reinterpretations of colonial genocides and their repercussions on
the western World.6 Most importantly, Moses and others have linked the colo-
nial genocides of the “racial century (1850–1950)” and the Holocaust to a single
modernization process of accelerating violence that culminated in Auschwitz.
Rejecting the idea that the roots of fascism can be found in German history
alone, they argue that rather than “taking a ‘special path’ to modernity or stand-
ing apart sui generis from the other European powers, Germany is the exemplar
of an experience they all underwent in varying degrees of intensity. It is the
country where the process occurred most radically.”7
The “new” school of genocide studies draws heavily on ideas that were first
formulated within the context of the highly politicized French decolonization
debate; prominent intellectual critics of colonialism such as Aime´ Ce´saire,
Octave Mannoni, and Frantz Fanon pointed to the enduring psychological
deformation of the “colonial masters” and interpreted fascism as European colo-
nialism turned inward.8 As Aime´ Ce´saire famously remarked in his Discours sur le
colonialisme (1950), the white Christian bourgeois could not forgive Hitler for
unleashing colonial violence within Europe and for treating the White Man
in a manner previously reserved for Indians, Africans, and Arabs.9 Even
before Ce´saire, the African-American intellectual W. E. B. DuBois wrote in
The World and Africa (1947) that “there was no Nazi atrocity—concentration
camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women, or ghastly blas-
phemy of children—which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long
been practicing against colored folks in all parts of the world in the name of
and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world.”10 In short, colo-
nialism, as Jean-Paul Sartre famously argued, was a “boomerang” that returned
to Europe in the form of fascism.11
6Enzo Traverso, La violence nazie: une ge´ne´alogie europe´enne (Paris: La Fabrique, 2002), and Sven
Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes (London: New Press, 1997); Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age
of the Nation-State, vols. 1 and 2 (London and New York: Tauris, 2005); Eric D. Weitz, A Century
of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); A. Dirk
Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of
Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 36 (2002): 7–36, and A. Dirk Moses,
ed., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2008); Dan Stone, ed., The Historiography of Genocide (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008).
7Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 34.
8Frantz Fanon, Les Damne´s de la terre (Paris: Franc¸ois Maspero, 1961), with a foreword by Jean-Paul
Sartre; Aime´ Ce´saire, Discours sur le colonialisme (Paris: Re´clame, 1950); Octave Mannoni, Psychologie
de la colonisation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1950).
9Ce´saire, Discours, 10 f.
10As quoted in Richard H. King, Race, Culture, and the Intellectuals, 1940–1970 (Washington,
D.C., and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 47.
11See Sartre’s foreword to Fanon, Les Damne´s.
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The most intellectually influential interpretation of the connections between
the era of imperialism and National Socialism was, however, offered in Hannah
Arendt’s masterpiece, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), which offered a
challenging (though not empirically proven) interpretation of the destructive
effects of imperialism on normative political and moral values within Europe.
According to Arendt, during the late nineteenth century, European imperialism
served as a laboratory of amalgamated racial doctrines and anonymous bureau-
cratic policies that were based on “decrees” rather than the rule of law. These
ideas and practices were subsequently reimported into Europe where they
merged with a newly secularized and racialized anti-Semitism that went hand
in hand with the vo¨lkisch nationalism promoted by pan-movements in the multi-
ethnic empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria.
In recent years, Arendt’s arguments have been rediscovered by various
academic disciplines, ranging from postcolonial studies to genocide studies.12
The current wave of scholarship has challenged many orthodoxies in the field
of genocide studies and has uncovered stimulating new ways of overcoming
Eurocentric perspectives on the history of mass killings. But the hypothesis of
the Holocaust’s non-European roots has also been taken too far, most notably
in some of the most recent literature on the German “genocides” against
the Herero and Nama in Southwest Africa between 1904 and 1907 and their
alleged role as “models” for the Nazi war of extermination after 1939/41.13
12See, for example, the essays printed in Richard H. King and Dan Stone, eds., Hannah Arendt and
the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2007).
See, too, Paul Gilroy, Between Camps: Nations, Culture, and the Allure of Race (London: Allen Lane:
2000), and Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Multiculture or Postcolonial Melancholia (London: Routledge,
2004).
13This idea was first formulated by Helmut Bley, Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-
Su¨dwestafrika 1894–1914 (Hamburg: Leipniz Verlag, 1968). More recently, see Ju¨rgen Zimmerer,
“Krieg, KZ und Vo¨lkermord in Su¨dwestafrika. Der erste deutsche Genozid,” in Vo¨lkermord in
Deutsch-Su¨dwestafrika. Der Kolonialkrieg (1904 - 1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen, ed. Ju¨rgen
Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2003); Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, “Holocaust
und Kolonialismus. Beitrag zu einer Archa¨ologie des genozidalen Gedankens,” Zeitschrift fu¨r
Geschichtswissenschaft 51 (2003): 1098–1119; Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, “Die Geburt des ‘Ostlandes’ aus
dem Geiste des Kolonialismus. Ein postkolonialer Blick auf die NS-Eroberungs- und Vernichtungs-
politik,” Sozial. Geschichte. Zeitschrift fu¨r die historische Analyse des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts (2004):
10–43; Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz. Beitra¨ge zum Verha¨ltnis von Kolonialismus
und Holocaust (Mu¨nster: LIT, 2007); Benjamin Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz: How German
South West Africa Included Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern
Europe,” European History Quarterly 33 (2005): 429–464; Janntje Bo¨hlke-Itzen, Kolonialschuld und
Entscha¨digung. Der deutsche Vo¨lkermord an den Hereros 1904–1907 (Frankfurt: Brandes und Apsel,
2004). See, too, Rosa Amelie Plumelle-Uribe, Weisse Barbarei. Vom Kolonialrassismus zur Rassenpolitik
(Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 2004). Trutz von Trotha, “Genozidaler Pazifizierungskrieg. Soziologische
Anmerkungen zum Konzept des Genozids am Beispiel des Kolonialkrieges in Deutsch-Su¨dwest-
afrika 1904–1907,” Zeitschrift fu¨r Genozidforschung 4 (2003): 30–57. Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, Deutsche
Herrschaft u¨ber Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia, 2nd ed.
(Mu¨nster and Hamburg: LIT, 2002). Jan-Bart Gewald, Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the
Herero of Namibia 1890–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Among others, they
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According to Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, the most productive and challenging proponent
of this particular argument, the connections between the “genocidal” war in
German Southwest Africa and the Nazi war of extermination in east-central
Europe go far beyond mere phenomenological similarities. Although Zimmerer
has repeatedly distanced himself from any mono-causal explanations of the
Holocaust, the apparent causal nexus between “Windhoek and Auschwitz”
remains at his arguments’ core, implying that, by ignoring the “African roots”
of the Holocaust, international scholarship on the history of the Third Reich
has overlooked a central element in explaining the Nazis’ mass murder of
European Jewry. The German colonial wars against the Herero and Nama rep-
resent, he argues, a “decisive link to the crimes of the Nazis” and were an
“important source of ideas” for Germany’s war of annihilation in eastern
Europe after 1939/41. Both Germany’s “obsession” with “space and race”
and the fact that the expulsion and murder of the European Jews was not
viewed as a “taboo violation” are represented as direct legacies of Germany’s
colonial past.14 “The willingness to exterminate certain groups of people” is
the “ultimate taboo violation,” which first took shape in the colonies and ulti-
mately assumed “its most radical form in the Holocaust.” The campaign against
the Herero was therefore “paradigmatic for the Nazi war of extermination”:
“even the murder of the Jews” would “probably not have been possible”
without Germany’s colonial experience.15 The title of Zimmerer’s most
recent book, From Windhoek to Auschwitz,16 suggests the Herero War as the
starting point of a genocidal path that ended in the Holocaust, and represents
the semantic climax of a thesis that challenges whole libraries of literature on
reject the interpretations put forward in Horst Gru¨nder and Gisela Graichen, eds., Deutsche Kolonien.
Traum und Trauma, 5th ed. (Berlin: Ullstein, 2007). With respect to continuities between the violent
suppression of the Chinese Boxers’ Rising and the Third Reich, see Susanne Kuß, “Deutsche Sol-
daten wa¨hrend des Boxeraufstandes in China. Elemente und Urspru¨nge des Vernichtungskrieges,” in
Das Deutsche Reich und der Boxeraufstand, ed. Susanne Kuß and Bernd Martin (Munich: Iudicium,
2002), 165–181.
14Ju¨rgen Zimmerer, “Colonial Genocide and the Holocaust: Towards an Archeology of Geno-
cide,” in Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian
History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 49–76, 68; Ju¨rgen Zimmerer,
“The Birth of the ‘Ostland’ out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on Nazi
Policy of Conquest and Extermination,” Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (June 2005): 197–219.
15Zimmerer, “Holocaust und Kolonialismus,” 1116, 1119; Zimmerer, “Krieg, KZ,” 62f.; Ju¨rgen
Zimmerer, “Rassenkrieg und Vo¨lkermord. Der Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Su¨dwestafrika und die
Globalgeschichte des Genozids,” in Genozid und Gedenken. Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte und Gegen-
wart, ed. Henning Melber (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2005), 48; Zimmerer, “Die Geburt
des ‘Ostlandes,’” 29.
16Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz. For a similar line of argument, see Madley, “From
Africa to Auschwitz,” 429.
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the origins of the Holocaust as well as recent general histories of the Third
Reich in which Germany’s colonial past plays no role whatsoever.17
Building on Zimmerer’s articles as well as other ideas on “totalitarian conti-
nuities” between German Southwest Africa and Nazi Germany put forward by
Henning Melber,18 the American historian Benjamin Madley also suggested
that the idea of Lebensraum and the concept of concentration camps was first
tested in German Southwest Africa and that the Nazis “borrowed ideas and
methods from the German Southwest African genocide that they then
employed and expanded upon. Genocidal rhetoric, a new definition of Vernich-
tungskrieg, executing POWs, murdering civilians en masse, and deporting POWs
and noncombatants to work and death camps were all introduced to modern
German history through the Namibian colonial experience.”19
One problem with these arguments is that their chronological and spatial
boundaries are not always clearly stated, making critical engagement difficult.
In the majority of Zimmerer’s numerous articles on the subject, the German
war against the Herero and Nama takes center stage.20 His key argument is
that the war of 1904 and the accompanying or subsequent expulsion and exter-
mination of the Herero and Nama in concentration camps represented an
unprecedented “taboo violation” (the “first genocide of the twentieth
century”) and a new level of state-sponsored violence against civilians with
devastating long-term effects. In other publications, however, the German colo-
nial massacres of 1904 are for Zimmerer only one case among a number of
historically and geographically diverse examples, suggesting the more encom-
passing nature of colonialism’s destructive potential and legacy. Even within
this considerably more expanded perspective, however, Zimmerer emphasizes
the German war against the Herero and Nama as an “outstanding event in a
global history of the unleashing of violence.”21
The idea of direct continuities of “colonial violence” from Windhoek to
Auschwitz has received both support and sustained criticism. While Michael
Brumlik has recently suggested that the “exemplary character of the German
17See, for example, Peter Longerich, Policy of Destruction: Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy and the Genesis of
the “Final Solution” (Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Museum, 2001). Christopher
R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, 1939–1942
(London: Heinemann, 2004); Saul Friedla¨nder, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2 vols. (London and
New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997 and 2007).
18Henning Melber, “Kontinuita¨ten totaler Herrschaft: Vo¨lkermord und Apartheid in Deutsch-
Su¨dwestafrika. Zur kolonialen Herrschaftspraxis im Deutschen Kaiserreich,” Jahrbuch fu¨r Antisemitis-
musforschung 1 (1992): 91–114.
19Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz,” 458.
20Strangely enough, the much more large-scale violence inflicted on the indigenous population
during Maji-Maji war is not mentioned in this context although the death figures are significantly
higher than during the Herero uprising. See Feliticas Becker and Jigal Beez, eds., Der Maji-Maji-
Krieg in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1905–1907 (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2005).
21Zimmerer, “Rassenkrieg und Vo¨lkermord,” 48.
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colonial wars” for the Nazis’ extermination policy is “gaining increasing plausi-
bility,”22 scholars such as Pascal Grosse and Birthe Kundrus have pointed to some
important structural shortcomings of the continuity thesis. On the one hand,
Grosse has emphasized that the peculiarities of German colonialism are to be
found less in its violent suppression of indigenous uprisings than in its abrupt
end in 1918. The Versailles Treaty made Germany a postcolonial power in a
colonial world and contributed to the reorientation of colonial fantasies
toward east-central Europe: “While the major colonial powers underwent a
process of decolonization much later and as a result of independence movements
in the colonies themselves, Germany was stripped of its colonial possessions as a
direct consequence of its defeat in World War I, which left a complete vacuum
in the sphere of expansionism exactly when expansionist aspirations had reached
their height.”23 Kundrus, on the other hand, has convincingly argued that super-
ficial phenomenological similarities between colonial and fascist violence should
not be confused with direct lines of continuity and that colonial rhetoric is not
the same as colonial policy.24
Building on these first reactions, this essay will engage more systematically
with the hypothesis of “connections” and structural similarities between
“Windhoek and Auschwitz.” First, it will critically examine the allegedly
“exceptional” character of the German colonial wars within the broader trans-
national context of colonial violence, a context that was central to Hannah
Arendt’s arguments about the origins of totalitarianism. It argues that the
“taboo violation” of 1904 was in fact very much in line with common European
colonial standards and practices. Neither massacres of an indigenous population
classified as “inferior” nor the scope, nature, and objectives of the violence
unleashed in German Southwest Africa constituted genuinely “new” or excep-
tional levels of violence previously unknown to European colonialism.
22Michael Brumlik, “Das Jahrhundert der Extreme,” in Vo¨lkermord und Kriegsverbrechen in der ersten
Ha¨lfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Irmtrud Wojak and Susanne Meinl (Frankfurt and New York: Campus,
2004), 19–36, here 28. For a similar view, see Uta G. Poiger, “Imperialism and Empire in Twentieth-
Century Germany,” History & Memory 17 (2005): 117–143, particularly 122.
23Pascal Grosse, “What Does German Colonialism Have to Do with National Socialism? A Con-
ceptual Framework,” in Germany’s Colonial Pasts, ed. Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal
(Lincoln, NE, and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 115–134, here 118–9. Pascal
Grosse, “From Colonialism to National Socialism to Postcolonialism: Hannah Arendt’s ‘Origins
of Totalitarianism,’” Postcolonial Studies 9 (2006): 35–52. See, too, Dirk van Laak, “Afrika vor den
Toren. Deutsche Raum- und Ordnungsvorstellungen nach der erzwungenen ‘Dekolonisation,’”
in Ordnungen in der Krise. Zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 1900–1933, ed. Wolfgang
Hardtwig (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 95–114.
24Birthe Kundrus, “Kontinuita¨ten, Parallelen, Rezeptionen. U¨berlegungen zur ‘Kolonialisierung’
des Nationalsozialismus,” Werkstatt Geschichte 43 (2006): 45–62. Birthe Kundrus, “Von den Herero
zum Holocaust? Einige Bemerkungen zur aktuellen Debatte,” Mittelweg (2005): 82–91. Birthe
Kundrus, “Von Windhoek nach Nu¨rnberg? Koloniale ‘Mischehenverbote’ und die nationalsoziali-
stische Rassengesetzgebung,” in“Phantasiereiche.” Der deutsche Kolonialismus aus kulturgeschichtlicher
Perspektive, ed. Birthe Kundrus (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2003), 110–131.
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Second, the essay will highlight the lack of evidence for direct personal and
structural continuities between Windhoek and Auschwitz. Rejecting some of
the rather constructed continuity arguments that have been suggested so far, it
will be argued instead that National Socialism and the German war of annihi-
lation constituted a break with European traditions of colonialism rather than
a continuation.
  
If Hannah Arendt’s hypothesis about the colonial roots of European fascism is to
serve as a genuine starting point for an investigation into the interconnectedness
of colonialism and fascism, then the inter- and transnational nature of colonial
violence must remain at the center of any analytical framework. The assertion
of a peculiar German “taboo violation” in Southwest Africa that consisted of
the declared intention of “exterminating a certain group of people” may
appear plausible within a nation-centric framework of investigation, but it is
highly questionable when placed within the broader context of western colo-
nialism.25 Unlike some scholars in recent years, Hannah Arendt never advocated
the notion that “taboo violations” and colonial careers, institutional practices,
and mentalities reached all the way from the Waterberg to Auschwitz. On the
contrary, in her chapter, “Race-Thinking before Racism,” Arendt explicitly
argues that neither the Germans nor the Nazis invented racial theories. The
continuing appeal of Arendt’s interpretation partly stems from the fact that
she analyzed anti-Semitism, racism, and colonialism as transnational, European
phenomena. Her focus on elements of totalitarian rule (a word that was
omitted from the English title of Elemente und Urspru¨nge totalita¨rer Herrschaft),
whose effects could be felt at different times and in different places, is one of
the study’s great strengths. In Arendt’s analysis, Gobineau and Rhodes,
Conrad and Kipling are more important than Trotha, Maercker, and Epp.
The relevance of the German colonial experience is outweighed by the
Boers, the building of the Suez Canal, the “alliance between capital and the
mob,” as well as by the attempt to reorder “humanity into master and slave
races.”26 All of these ideas and violent colonial practices existed long before
General von Trotha unleashed his extermination campaign against the
Hereros. Transgressions of “civilized warfare” in the colonial sphere were
common currency among Europe’s colonial powers, and it is no coincidence
that Joseph Conrad’s frequently invoked metaphor of the “heart of darkness,”
which originally referred to the Belgian Congo, quickly became the inter-
national synonym par excellence for parallel colonial universes of violent suppres-
sion and exploitation. Even defenders of the “positive achievements” of
25Zimmerer, “Krieg, KZ,” 62.
26Arendt, Origins, 341.
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colonialism do not deny that the violent usurpation of land and resources, the
systematic destruction of the economic and cultural infrastructure of the van-
quished, and the introduction of racist legislation by European colonial
powers were standard procedure rather than an exceptional “taboo violation.”27
Three cases of colonial mass violence may suffice as examples to illustrate this
point: the American conquest of the Philippines, the Spanish colonial wars in
Cuba, and the French massacres in nineteenth-century Algeria.28
The American conquest and colonization of the Philippines between 1898
and 1902 and the ensuing expulsion and extermination of an indigenous civili-
zation defined along racist criteria reveal several structural similarities with the
subsequent events in German Southwest and Southeast Africa. A number of
military orders exist that can be seen as the functional equivalents of Lothar
von Trotha’s frequently quoted “extermination order” of 1904, including
Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith’s order that “I want no prisoners. I wish
you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me.
I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities
against the United States.” Smith had previously described how his experiences
in the wars against Native Americans had taught him how to combat “savages”
and threatened to transform the entire region into a “howling wilderness.”29
When, like Trotha in 1904, Smith was asked to clarify his order, he said that
every person over the age of ten was to be shot.30
In quantitative terms, the American colonial massacre (to which Rudyard
Kipling dedicated his frequently quoted poem The White Man’s Burden) exceeded
the death rates in German Southwest Africa many times over.31 It resulted in the
deaths of some 4,000 Americans, 20,000 Philippine soldiers, and between
27Daniel Lefeuvre, Che`re Alge´rie: La France et sa colonie (1930–1962), (Paris: Flammarion, 2005);
Daniel Lefeuvre, Pour en finir avec la repentance coloniale (Paris: Flammarion, 2007). For Britain, see the
otherwise “Empire-friendly” book by Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World
Order and the Lessons for Global Power (London: Allen Lane, 2002) as well as the most recent survey of
British imperial history by Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781–1997
(London: Random House, 2007).
28For further cases of colonial mass murder, see Boris Barth, Genozid: Vo¨lkermord im 20. Jahrhun-
dert. Geschichte, Theorien, Kontroversen (Munich: Beck, 2006); Mark Levene, The Rise of the West and
the Coming of Genocide (London and New York: Tauris, 2005). See, too, Marc Ferro, ed., Le livre noir
du colonialisme—XVIe-XXIe sie`cle (Paris: Seuil, 2003).
29Leon Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1 (New York: Random House,
1972), 804–809; Glenn Anthony May, “Was the Philippine-American War a Total War?,” in Antici-
pating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914, ed. Manfred Boemeke, Roger
Chickering, and Stig Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 446 f.
30David L. Fritz, “Before the ‘Howling Wilderness’: The Military Career of Jacob Hurd Smith,
1862–1902,” Military Affairs 43 (1979): 186–190. Jacob “Howling Wilderness” Smith, as he was
later called, was put on trial for war crimes in 1902, but was subsequently dismissed from the
army without a conviction. As in the case of von Trotha, the civil institutions intervened too late.
31Kipling’s poem was first published in McClure’s Magazine (February 1899) with the subtitle, “The
United States and the Philippine Islands.”
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250,000 and 750,000 civilians.32 In explaining the vastly greater number of
Philippine “casualties,” the commanding general, Arthur MacArthur, stated that
whites were less likely to succumb to their wounds than members of lower races.33
A useful conceptual tool in this context is the notion of a common western
“colonial archive,” to be understood as common knowledge on the treatment,
exploitation, and extermination of “sub-humans” accumulated by the western
powers over the course of colonial history. Once established, the knowledge
accumulated in the “colonial archive” could be “activated” in different geo-
graphical areas.34 The fact that twenty-six of the thirty U.S. generals operating
in the Philippines had gathered previous combat experience in the wars of
annihilation against the Native Americans and explicitly referred to aspects of
this warfare against “savages” as an important learning process for the Philippine
campaign exemplifies the transcontinental character of this colonial archive.35
In a Senate hearing on the atrocities in the Philippines, MacArthur himself
emphasized the transnational character of colonial practices: “Many thousands
of years ago our Aryan ancestors raised cattle, made a language, multiplied in
numbers, and overflowed. By due process of expansion to the west they occu-
pied Europe, developed arts and sciences, and created a great civilization, which,
separating into innumerable currents, inundated and fertilized the globe with
blood and ideas, the primary bases of all human progress, incidentally crossing
the Atlantic and thereby reclaiming, populating, and civilizing a hemisphere.
The broad actuating laws which underlie all these wonderful phenomena are
still operating with relentless vigor and have recently forced one of the currents
of this magnificent Aryan people across the Pacific—that is to say, back almost to
the cradle of its race—thus initiating a stage of progressive social evolution
32Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines,
1899–1903 (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Brian McAllister Linn,
The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2000); John M. Gates,
“War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898–1902,” Pacific Historical Review 53 (1984): 367–
378; Frank Schumacher, ‘“Niederbrennen, plu¨ndern und to¨ten sollt ihr.’ Der Kolonialkrieg der
USA auf den Philippinen (1899–1913),” in Kolonialkriege. Milita¨rische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperia-
lismus, ed. Frank Schumacher and Thoralf Klein (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), 114 f. These
figures are highly disputed, but they refer only to the number of victims up until 1902 (not until
1913) and do not include the “casualties” of the Moro Wars.
33Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation,” 189.
34See the usage of the term “settler archive” by Lorenzo Veracini in “Colonialism and Genocides:
Notes for the Analysis of the Settler Archive,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide, ed. Moses, 148–161. On
Lothar von Trotha’s transnational “learning process,” see the highly original study by Christoph
Kamissek, “Lernorte des Vo¨lkermordes? Die Kolonialerfahrungen des Generals Lothar von Trotha
in Ostafrika, China und Su¨dwestafrika (1894–1907)” (unpublished MA thesis, Humboldt Univer-
sity Berlin, 2007). A recent study has further demonstrated that the “colonial lessons” learned during
the counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Vietnam continue to influence U.S. military strat-
egies. See John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and
Vietnam (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2002).
35Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 2003), 127.
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which may reasonably be expected to result in substantial contributions on
behalf of the unity of the race and the brotherhood of man.”36
MacArthur’s emphasis on the Aryan “civilizing mission” in particular under-
lines the transnational nature of the colonial archive. Similar observations can be
made for the Spanish-Cuban war between 1895 and 1898. Before the com-
manding Spanish general Valeriano Weyler started his infamous “reconcentra-
tion” program, which herded much of the rural population into Spanish-held
towns and which cost the lives of at least 155,000 Cuban civilians, he had gath-
ered experience in suppressing and exterminating indigenous populations in the
Spanish-occupied Philippines. The parallels with the German (and American)
case go beyond the use of extreme violence against a local population. Just
like von Trotha’s (and MacArthur’s) extermination campaign, Weyler’s actions
met with fierce criticism from parts of the Spanish public, and in 1887 Valeriano
“The Butcher” Weyler was replaced with a more moderate military commander
who abandoned the Spanish camp system.37
Weyler’s concentration camps soon, however, assumed a prominent place in
the European colonial archive. By 1900, the Spanish term reconcentracio´n had
already been translated into English and was used to describe British “concen-
tration camps,” initiated by Lord Kitchener during the Second Boer War in
South Africa (1899–1902). Just like Weyler in Cuba, Kitchener had become
increasingly frustrated with the Boers’ guerrilla tactics and duly “concentrated”
native civilians into camps in order to deprive the enemy combatants of shelter
and support. Once again, misery and famine as well as soaring mortality rates
were the result. The connection between the South African camps and the
Cuban camps was clear to contemporaries; at the time, the British were both
praised and attacked by the international press for adapting “General Weyler’s
methods” to the Transvaal.38 Shortly afterward, the American army used con-
centration camps for Philippine civilians, particularly in the rebellious province
of Batangas, where the vigorous implementation of a policy of reconcentracio´n
led to horrific death rates among the civilian population.39 Two years later, the
36MacArthur as quoted in Helmut Walser Smith, “The Logic of Colonial Violence: Germany in
Southwest Africa (1904–1907), the United States in the Philippines (1899–1902),” in German and
American Nationalism: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Hartmut Lehmann and Hermann Wellenreuther
(Oxford: Berg, 1999), 205–231, here 220.
37John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina University Press, 2006), 153–179 and 193–225.
38See, for example, Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (New York: Palgrave, 2003). A
recent attempt at writing a bibliography of the vast literature on the Boer War was undertaken by
Fred van Hartesveldt, The Boer War: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (London: Greenwood
Press, 2000).
39Glenn Anthony May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War (London and New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 262–267.
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same “successful” policy was adopted in another colonial setting, German
Southwest Africa.40
Racist discourses and the administrative planning and execution of policies of
colonial conquest, expulsion, and extermination can, however, be traced back
even further. In the French conquest of Algeria, to name a third example, esti-
mates of the (largely civilian) victims between 1830 and 1872 range from
250,000 to 900,000.41 Here, too, the murder of civilian men, women, and
children, and the systematic destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods were
standard practice for decades. In 1841, General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud pro-
claimed the long-term aim of the Algerian extermination campaign by stating
that “the goal is not to persecute the Arabs, which would be entirely useless.
The point is to prevent the Arabs from sowing, harvesting, pasturing, using
their fields. Swarm out every year and burn their harvest. Or else exterminate
them all to the last man.”42
The American and French cases in particular illustrate that colonial violence
was by no means confined to authoritarian states. Quite the opposite: the states
with the longest and ultimately most violent colonial record—France, Britain,
the United States, and the Netherlands—remained democracies throughout
the twentieth century, thus confirming rather than contradicting Alexis de
Tocqueville’s famous observations about the expansionist and potentially
violent nature of democracies.43
The thesis of the unique quality and significance of the German colonial
massacres in Africa is therefore difficult to uphold. If one rejects the hypothetical
possibility of a German colonial Sonderweg and interprets the use of colonial vio-
lence as a common European legacy, the issue of direct continuities becomes
much more complicated. Why are the countries with the longest and (over
the course of centuries) most violent colonial traditions not identical with
those countries that unleashed the greatest degree of racist destruction both at
home and abroad after 1918? If the intensive experience of colonial subjugation
and extermination contributes to an individual and institutional brutalization
that can be transferred back to Europe, then the discrepancies between
England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the one hand, and
40Joel Kotek and Pierre Rigoulot, Le Sie`cle des Camps: Emprisonnement, Detention, Extermination—
cent ans de mal absolu (Paris: Latte`s, 2006).
41As in practically all colonial wars, the numbers of victims in this case are uncertain and highly
disputed. For the highest estimates, see Kamel Kateb, Europe´ens, “Indige`nes” et Juifs en Alge´rie
(1830–1962): Repre´sentations et re´alite´s des populations (Paris: INED, 2001), 47; see, too, Olivier Le
Cour Grandmaison, Coloniser, Exterminer: Sur la guerre et l’e´tat colonial (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 188–
192. For the lowest estimates, see Lefeuvre, Pour en finir, 65.
42As quoted in Franc¸ois Maspero, L’Honneur de Saint-Arnaud (Paris: E´ditions Points Seuil, 1993),
177 f.
43See Harald Bluhm, “Tocqueville—Der klassische Analytiker der modernen Demokratie,” in
Alexis de Tocqueville. Kleine Politische Schriften, ed. Harald Bluhm (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006),
111–47, here 33.
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Germany (and one could also add Austria) on the other are difficult to explain.
In other words, the hypothesis of unbroken continuities between “Africa and
Auschwitz” fails to account for the fact that Britain and France practiced policies
of violent colonial suppression long before (and after) 1945, but simultaneously
remained the bastions of democracy and never pursued policies of genocide
within Europe.
In a cautious attempt to explain this discrepancy, Dirk Schumann has recently
argued that the relative domestic stability of interwar France and Britain (rela-
tive, that is, when measured against the situation in Germany) was partly due
to the fact that their violent potential was relieved in the colonies, an option
no longer available to Germany after 1918.44 This argument complements
Pascal Grosse’s suggestion that while there “was probably no innate difference”
between European colonialisms before 1914, there “certainly was in their
experience of decolonization.” In Grosse’s view, Germany’s unique experience
of decolonization and its “colonialism without colonies” after 1918 became a
“fundamental factor in the interwar radicalization of pre-World War I ideas
and practices of expansionist biopolitics.”45
Even if one does not subscribe to an interpretation of National Socialism as a
substitute for lost opportunities to “discharge” violence in the colonies or
view World War II as a “recolonization” conflict, Schumann’s and Grosse’s
interventions point to experiences of violence between Windhoek and Ausch-
witz that were of crucial significance for the personal development and
careers of future protagonists in the Third Reich, but which are largely absent
in the debate about continuities between 1904 and 1941. What is surprising
about the course of the current debate on the continuation of colonial traditions
by Nazi Germany is the extent to which World War I has been neglected.46
The experience of the Great War, during which both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively new dimensions of extermination were attained, the special forms the
war assumed in the east as well as the years of border fighting, civil wars, and
Freikorps campaigns that profoundly impacted east-central Europe between
1918 and 1923, play no role whatsoever in any of the studies advocating
direct lines of continuity between Windhoek and Auschwitz. Instead, it is
implicitly assumed that a genocidal German military machine stopped at the
Waterberg and went into gear again during the attack on Poland and the
Soviet Union, this time backed by a “strong state.” Yet it can reasonably be
44Dirk Schumann, “Europa, der erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit. Eine Kontinuita¨t der
Gewalt?,” Journal of Modern European History 1 (2003): 23–43.
45Grosse, “German Colonialism,” 118–119.
46Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, and Irina Renz, eds., “Keiner fu¨hlt sich hier mehr als
Mensch.” Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen: Klartext, 1993); Gerhard Hirschfeld
et al., eds., Kriegserfahrungen. Studien zur Sozial- und Mentalita¨tsgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges
(Essen: Klartext, 1997).
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argued that the roots of Germany’s deviation from the path of other European
colonial powers should not be sought in the year 1904 but rather in the immedi-
ate postwar period. Alongside the Great War, the experiences of defeat, revolu-
tion, and civil war retain a central significance in explaining an enhanced
potential for and willingness to use violence.47 It is no coincidence that the
greatest destructive potential after 1918 emanated from those revisionist states
that were either among the “official” losers of World War I or, in the case of
Italy, considered themselves to have won the war but lost the peace.
Another important objection to the continuity argument is the lack of direct
personal linkages between 1904 and 1939/41. A twenty-year-old soldier, who
participated in the mass killings of the Herero and Nama and who survived
World War I, would have been a sixty-year-old man during the Nazis’ Operation
Barbarossa. The commanding officers of the 1904 campaign were born between
the 1840s and 1860s. Assuming that they were still alive at the beginning of the
Nazi war against the Soviet Union, they would have been between eighty and
ninety years old. Previous studies have sought to bridge this “gap” between 1904
and 1941 by pointing to “knowledge transfers” from one generation to the next.
Benjamin Madley, for example, has suggested that the Auschwitz doctor Josef
Mengele was profoundly influenced by the anthropologist Eugen Fischer,
who had conducted racial field studies in Southwest Africa in 1908. He also
argued that Hermann Go¨ring became a proponent of colonialism (in his case
of eastern Europe) through his father, the first German Reichskommisar of
German Southwest Africa (1885–91). However important these findings may
be, the exact significance of such influences on the future careers of prominent
Nazis is impossible to measure.48 “Traditions” and “knowledge” can certainly
be handed down from one generation to another, yet as easy as it is to assume
the existence of “teacher-student relationships” and indirect transmissions of
genocidal practices within the framework of individual or institutional
memory, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact impact of such influ-
ences on individual careers and mentalities.49 “Students” generally have more
than one teacher, and institutions feed their “collective memory” from a vast
pool of different traditions.
Even if it is possible to trace a handful of violent careers between Windhoek
and Auschwitz, it is unclear what the depiction of twenty or even two hundred
such military careers can contribute to our understanding of the German war of
extermination. Even in the highly unlikely event that all of the few thousand
veterans of Southwest Africa participated in the German war effort on the
Eastern Front, they would have been a marginally small group within a
47Robert Gerwarth, “The Central European Counterrevolution: Paramilitary Violence in
Germany, Austria, and Hungary after the Great War,” Past & Present 200 (2008): 175–209.
48Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz,” 450–457.
49Zimmerer, “The Birth of the ‘Ostland,’” 213–218.
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German army that already amounted to roughly three million men at the begin-
ning of Operation Barbarossa.50 The quantitative ratio alone raises questions
about the impact that Germany’s African experiences of violence could have
had on this enormous invasion army and its military leaders. Advocates of the
continuity hypothesis have often referred to the case of Franz Xaver Ritter
von Epp, a former colonial officer, Freikorps leader, and subsequent director
of the Third Reich’s Colonial Office, as “living proof” of continuities
between Africa and the Third Reich. Yet Epp had no influence on the extermi-
nation policies of the Third Reich whatsoever and was increasingly marginalized
after the abandonment of the Madagascar Plan, a process that culminated in the
dissolution of the Colonial Office in 1943.51 To what extent the far more influ-
ential Reich Security Main Office’s fanaticized personnel, who were directly
responsible for the planning and execution of the “Final Solution,” was influ-
enced by knowledge of the German colonial massacres in Africa and the ideo-
logical concepts underpinning Wilhelmine colonialism remains an open
question. Thus far the flourishing field of Nazi perpetrator studies has revealed
no evidence of the significance of African colonial traditions for the radicaliza-
tion of this Generation des Unbedingten.52
The sole proof offered in support of the continuity theory is therefore a
handful of overlapping biographies and a number of Hitler and Himmler quota-
tions that suggest an analogy between colonialism and the German war of
annihilation, most famously an excerpt from Hitler’s table talk of September
1941: “The Russian space is our India, and just like the English have ruled it
50Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 21, assumes that 1,500 German soldiers participated
in the Battle of Waterberg.
51Katja-Maria Wa¨chter, Die Macht der Ohnmacht. Leben und Politik des Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp
(1868–1946) (Frankfurt: Europa¨ische Hochschulschriften, 1999); Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum
Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1969), 774;
Dirk van Laak, “‘Ist je ein Reich, das es nicht gab, so gut verwaltet worden?’ Der imagina¨re Ausbau
der imperialen Infrastruktur in Deutschland nach 1918,” in Phantasiereiche, ed. Kundrus, 71–90;
Dirk van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur. Deutsche Planungen fu¨r eine Erschließung Afrikas 1880 bis 1960
(Paderborn: Scho¨ningh, 2004), 301–331. See, too, the recent study by Chantal Metzger, L’Empire
Colonial Franc¸ais dans la Strate´gie du Troisie`me Reich (1936–1945), 2 vols. (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2002).
52Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten. Das Fu¨hrungskorps des Reichssicherungshauptamtes
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), and Michael Wildt, ed., Nachrichtendienst, politische Elite, Mord-
einheit. Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfu¨hrers SS (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); Christopher
Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1992); Isabel Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut.” Das Rasse- und Sied-
lungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, 2003);
Johannes Hu¨rter, Hitlers Heerfu¨hrer. Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion
1941/42 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006); Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the
Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massen-
mord. Die Einsatzgruppe D in der su¨dlichen Sowjetunion 1941–1943 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition,
2003); Harald Welzer, Ta¨ter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmo¨rder werden (Frankfurt:
S. Fischer, 2005); Gerhard Paul, ed., Die Ta¨ter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz
normale Deutsche? (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, 2002).
292 ROBERT GERWARTH AND STEPHAN MALINOWSKI
with a handful of men, so will we rule this colonial space of ours.”53 Yet, as
Birthe Kundrus has argued convincingly, colonial rhetoric should not be con-
fused with colonial practices. Far more striking than a few rhetorical references
to British colonialism by Hitler, Himmler, and others are the structural differ-
ences between European colonial rule and the Nazi war of annihilation con-
cealed by such misleading colonial fantasies. Hitler’s verbal references to India,
for example, may have reflected his admiration for Britain’s ability to rule the
world’s largest empire with a handful of colonial officers, but they hardly con-
stitute proof of the argument that Hitler pursued colonial policies in eastern
Europe. Regardless of the numerous puppet regimes that were set up in some
German-occupied territories (such as the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia), Nazi Germany de facto never implemented a policy of indirect
rule in any part of occupied eastern Europe. From the interwar period in par-
ticular, Britain (and to a lesser extent France) promoted the systematic “western-
ization” of small indigenous elites in order to raise standards of efficiency and to
facilitate trade, while at the same time violently suppressing uprisings against
colonial rule.54 It is difficult to find analogies in the German war of extermina-
tion to this combination of development and force so characteristic of late
western European colonialism. “Development” in Poland, Belorussia, and the
Ukraine, for example, meant the physical annihilation of the indigenous elite,
and no member of this elite was ever able to follow the example of Nehru or
Gandhi by studying law at the best universities of the “colonial motherland.”
This observation extends to the countless collaborators from the Ukraine,
Latvia, and elsewhere who were welcome to support the German crusade
against “Judeo-Bolshevism” as willing executioners, but whose place in the
Nazi postwar order was never clearly defined.
Although mass killings of indigenous civilians in the context of conquest of
new territories and the suppression of resistance constituted a recurring
pattern in the history of western colonialism, it is certainly wrong to suggest
that “colonialism” is synonymous with extermination.55 During the German
war in east-central Europe, on the other hand, the policy of the extermination
of “racially inferior” populations was not a means to bring the war to a trium-
phant end or to “restore order,” but an end in itself. It constituted the very
purpose of the entire Operation Barbarossa and the Generalplan Ost.
53Hitler on September 17, 1941, as quoted in Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Fu¨hrerhauptquartier 1941–
1944. Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, ed. Werner Jochmann (Hamburg: Orbis, 1980), 62–63;
see, too, 193 and 361.
54On the ambivalent nature of colonial “westernization,” see Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and
African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and
West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
55As suggested, for example, by Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “The Other”
and the Myth of Modernity (New York: Continuum, 1995).
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An equally important difference between colonialism and Nazi Germany lies
in the crucial role of settler communities in bringing about military confronta-
tions in extra-European settings.56 Colonial wars and colonial massacres (includ-
ing those against the Herero and Nama) were particularly common and brutal
where a small minority of white settlers felt existentially threatened by indige-
nous resistance against their rule. In the case of the German attack on Poland,
however, there was no “thin white line,” no settler minorities that stood in con-
flict with an indigenous population. On the contrary, throughout the German
military campaign, the aim was to expel or exterminate the indigenous popu-
lation before “Aryan” settlers moved into the east.57
Advocates of the thesis of structural parallels between colonialism and fascism
have attempted to explain the numerous quantitative and qualitative differences
between the violence unleashed in 1904 and 1939/41 by suggesting that the key
difference is to be found in the more developed bureaucratic terror apparatus of
the Third Reich.58 Neglected in this perspective is the complete absence of a
“critical public” and (potentially moderating) civil institutions in the Third
Reich. Massacres of indigenous populations in the colonies were frequently crit-
icized in the contemporary press or in the parliaments in London, Paris, or
Berlin (often leading to the dismissal of the officers in charge). Even if those
interventions came too late for the victims, for example in the case of
German Southwest Africa (or indeed in the cases of the Spanish war on Cuba
and the American-Philippine War), it is important to acknowledge the existence
of civil institutions that were willing and able to intervene in colonial massacres.
Lothar von Trotha, whose military orders were largely responsible for the escala-
tion of mass violence in German Southwest Africa, had influential and
56Ju¨rgen Osterhammel, Kolonialismus. Geschichte—Formen—Folgen (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995),
58 and 70. For Kenya and Rhodesia, see Dane Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society and
Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1939 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987);
see, too, Michael Crowder, “The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa,” in Colonialism in Africa 1870–
1960, ed. Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, vol. II (Cambridge and London: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1970), 329. For the post-1945 period, see John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: The
Collapse of European Empires Overseas (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 146–185. Anthony H. M. Kirk-
Greene, “The Thin White Line,” African Affairs 79 (1980): 25–44; John W. Cell, “Colonial Rule,”
Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 232–25; Stephen
Constantine, “Migrants and Settlers,” Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 5, 163–187; Gesine
Kru¨ger, Kriegsbewa¨ltigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein. Realita¨t, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen
Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907 (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 69.
57On Walther Darre´’s concept of the “Wehrbauernho¨fe,” see Richard Walther Darre´, Neuadel aus
Blut und Boden (Munich: Lehmanns Verlag, 1930); Uwe Mai, Rasse und Raum. Agrarpolitik, Sozial-
und Raumplanung im NS-Staat (Paderborn: Scho¨ningh, 2002); Jan Erik Schulte, Zwangsarbeit und
Vernichtung: Das Wirtschaftsimperium der SS. Oswald Pohl und das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt
1933–1945 (Paderborn: Scho¨ningh, 2001).
58Zimmerer, “Holocaust und Kolonialismus,” 1114 f., Zimmerer, “Rassenkrieg und Vo¨lker-
mord,” 47.
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outspoken critics within Germany’s Social Democratic Party, among the mis-
sionaries and settlers in the colonies, and even within the German officer corps.
The same cannot be said about Nazi Germany. Recent studies on the Third
Reich have reinforced Ernst Fraenkel’s argument—put forward in his seminal
book The Dual State (1941)—that the traditional German bureaucracy collabo-
rated willingly and neatly with the newly established terror apparatus of
the Third Reich, an observation that cannot be extended to the situation
in German Southwest Africa in 1904.59 It is therefore highly questionable
whether the Third Reich can be seen as a particularly radical example of the
“modern state” or whether it constituted a new type of political regime that
broke with older traditions of “checks and balances,” as well as the ambivalent
traditions of colonialism.
In a similar recent debate about the French war in Algeria between 1954 and
1962, the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet rejected comparisons with Auschwitz
by pointing to the important fact that in Algeria some generals acted against
the existing laws of the French state, whereas Himmler, Eichmann, and Hey-
drich acted in accordance with them.60 The same holds true for comparisons
between German Southwest Africa and Auschwitz. Whereas the replacement
of von Trotha would have made an essential difference for the escalation of
the conflict in 1904, it is not clear what difference Heydrich’s replacement
with Kaltenbrunner made for the history of the Holocaust.
In one of the most convincing and empirically sound books on the Herero
wars, Isabel Hull has recently contrasted a specifically German, unrestrained
“military culture” with the British ability to control the escalation of violence,
for example during the Boer Wars.61 But even Hull’s findings do not support a
simplistic continuity thesis between 1904 and 1941, demonstrating instead that
the events of 1904 were less the result of a peculiarly German form of racism
than of the implementation of unsuitable military strategies that had been
devised and tested in a European context several decades before. Although
Hull convincingly points to the dramatic consequences of these destructive mili-
tary strategies during the Great War, it remains questionable how relevant the
legacies of Imperial Germany’s “military culture” continued to be during the
Third Reich. After all, the Third Reich was not a military dictatorship. The par-
ticular destructiveness of Nazi Germany and Hitler’s crusade in eastern Europe
59Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1941). See, too, Cornelia Essner, Die “Nu¨rnberger Gesetze” oder Die Verwaltung
des Rassenwahns 1933–1945 (Paderborn: Scho¨ningh, 2002); Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde.
Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941–1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger
Edition, 1999); Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany (London and
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
60Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Les assassins de la me´moire: “un Eichmann de papier” et autres essais sur le
re´visionnisme (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 168–180.
61Hull, Absolute Destruction.
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resulted from the smooth cooperation between civil and military institutions
rather than the marginalization of civil institutions, which Hull rightly describes
as a peculiarity of Imperial Germany’s “military culture.”
The Nazis’ systematic persecution and murder of every Jew in the Nazis’
sphere of influence—regardless of age, gender, or nationality—further raises
the important (but often side-lined) question about the exact relationship
between, and interconnectedness of, colonial racism and genocidal anti-Semi-
tism in Nazi Germany.62 Arendt herself argued that racism was not a uniquely
German attitude and that it preceded late-nineteenth-century colonialism
rather than being a product of it. In her chapter “Race and Bureaucracy,” she
states that the connection between colonialism and Nazism is indirect, but
that it had important “boomerang effects” on European public opinion that
made racism altogether more acceptable than it had been before. Yet, it still
remains to be empirically proven where the boomerang originated and where
it landed.
One important difference between colonial, color-coded racism and Euro-
pean anti-Semitism lies in the obvious fact that colonial racism was directed
against non-European (i.e., non-white) populations, whereas the Nazis’ anti-
Semitism before 1939 was primarily directed against the “internal enemy,”
including secular and fully integrated German Jews. As Omer Bartov has con-
vincingly argued in this context, the Nazis’ anti-Semitism differed from color-
coded racism in that the “Jewish enemy” was perceived to be both distinctly
alien to European civilization but also capable of appearing physically and
culturally “just like us.”63 From the Nazis’ perspective, it was this ability of
the Jewish enemy to disguise himself as European while simultaneously
working toward the collapse of European civilization that made him so
dangerous.
How and in what ways the immensely radicalized German anti-Semitism
after 1918 was influenced by the ideologically motivated and biologically
defined racism of European colonialism remains an open question, even
though this very question should be at the heart of any investigation of continu-
ities between “Windhoek and Auschwitz.” It may indeed be fruitful to investi-
gate the coinciding loss of Germany’s colonies (and hence their main theater
of racially motivated violence before 1918) and the simultaneous actualization
of violent anti-Semitism within Germany, but such an investigation aiming to
62The vast existing literature on German anti-Semitism has thus far not acknowledged any influ-
ences of colonial racism on anti-Semitism. See, for example, Friedla¨nder, Nazi Germany and the Jews;
Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (rev. ed., Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1988); Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Anti-Semitism (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda
during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
63Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,”
American Historical Review 103 (1998): 771–816, here 779 and 780.
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explain Germany’s deviation from European patterns would have to focus on the
years around 1918, not a non-existent unique “taboo violation” in 1904.
  
This essay has presented a number of objections to the much discussed thesis of
direct continuities and structural similarities between the German colonial mas-
sacres of 1904–1907 and the Nazi war of extermination in east-central Europe
between 1939 and 1945. As welcome (and long overdue) as the renewed schol-
arly interest in colonial massacres is, it remains questionable whether this
important research is qualitatively improved by constructing direct linkages to
Auschwitz. The thesis of a direct personal and structural continuity from Wind-
hoek to Auschwitz can be dismissed on empirical grounds without making the
German or European track record of colonial violence look “better.”
It is equally questionable whether it is sensible to conceptualize “fascism” as a
form of “colonialism” and the Holocaust as a “colonial genocide.” Even though
it has become fashionable to label the Nazi war of extermination a war of “colo-
nial conquest,” recent studies on the German occupation of eastern Europe have
uncovered few structural parallels with western colonialism. Thus far, the “colo-
nial turn” in the historiography of the Third Reich has been confined to a
primarily semantic redefinition of the German war of extermination.
Future research in this field will also have to address the question how useful the
term “genocide” is for historians interested in the comparative aspects of mass kill-
ings. Raphael Lemkin’s term “genocide”—coined in 1944 and codified in the
1948 UN Genocide Convention—constitutes an important legal instrument for
the prevention of intentional mass killings or indeed for the persecution of perpe-
trators. It remains debatable, however, whether a legal definition that focuses on
the genocidal intention (even if there are no victims at all) rather than the structural
causes of mass violence is equally useful for historians.64 Whether the destruction
of the native peoples of central and southern America by Spanish or Portugese
conquistadores,65 the extermination of the Aborigines of Tasmania by British settlers
in the 1830s,66 and the Russian army’s brutal expulsion of perhaps two million
Circassians and Turkic peoples in the 1830s67 can be retrospectively classified as
acts of “genocide” according to a legal definition of 1944 is a question of
64An important contribution to this debate was made by Jacques Semelin, Purifier et de´truire: Usages
politiques des massacres et des ge´nocides (Paris: Seuil, 2005) and in the essays of David El Kenz and E´ric
Wenzel in David El Kenz, ed., Le massacre: objet d’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), 7–45.
65Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row,
1998).
66Mark Cocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conflict with Tribal Peoples (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1998).
67Stephen D. Shenfield, “The Circassians: a Forgotten Genocide?,” in The Massacre in History, ed. Mark
Levene and Penny Roberts (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 149–163; Anatol Lieven,
Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
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secondary importance to historians. It may in fact distract from the far more
important historiographical task of explaining how and why European states at
different times unleashed campaigns of mass violence against populations they
considered “inferior.”
Furthermore, the German “taboo violation” of 1904 must be placed more
consistently within the European or “western” context of violent colonial prac-
tices than has thus far been the case. Mass killings of indigenous civilian popu-
lations previously classified as racially or culturally “inferior” were common
currency in Europe’s colonial empires and are not indicative of a German colo-
nial Sonderweg. The post-1945 colonial wars and massacres, such as those in
Madagascar (1947), Kenya (1952–60), and Algeria (1954–62), suggest that
even full knowledge of the Holocaust was no guarantee against a certain type
of colonial warfare.
Half a century after the publication of the The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah
Arendt’s thesis of racist imperialism as a laboratory for totalitarianism continues to
pose an intellectual challenge for historians of the Third Reich.68 Despite the
doubts about direct linkages between “Windhoek and Auschwitz” expressed
in this essay, it remains plausible to assume that the ideas and practices that charac-
terized Europe’s colonial mastery over the world had some repercussions on inner-
European history and that “knowledge transfers” occurred in some areas (such as
eugenics and “racial hygiene,” settlement planning, and racist legislation). But the
extent to which these transfers affected the decision-making processes that led to
the Holocaust has thus far not been convincingly demonstrated. Further empiri-
cal studies on eugenics and racist anthropology will be needed to determine the
exact impact of such knowledge transfers.69 Here, too, it will be important to
remember that the other colonial powers had been active in these fields just as
intensely as (and considerably longer than) Germany.
The examination of such transfers calls for an approach that can encompass
both the common construction of a European colonial archive and its very
different applications in various geographical contexts. Such an approach
68Arendt, Origins, 12. See the critical engagement with the “laboratory of modernity” idea by
Dirk van Laak, “Kolonien als “Laboratorien der Moderne?,” in Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutsch-
land in der Welt 1871–1914, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Ju¨rgen Osterhammel (Go¨ttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 257–279.
69Important pioneering studies in this field have been presented by Pascal Grosse, Kolonialismus,
Eugenik und bu¨rgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1850–1914 (Frankfurt and New York: Campus,
2001), 26–31; So¨ren Niemann-Findeisen, Weeding the Garden. Die Eugenik-Rezeption der fru¨hen
Fabian Society (Mu¨nster: Westfa¨lisches Dampfboot, 2004); Christian Geulen, Wahlverwandte. Rassen-
diskurs und Nationalismus im spa¨ten 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2004). On “scien-
tific racism,” eugenics, and the Nazis’ obsession with public health, see, too, Detlev Peukert, “The
Genesis of the Final Solution from the Spirit of Science,” in Reevaluating the Third Reich, ed. Thomas
Childers and Jane Caplan (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1994), and Paul Weindling, Health, Race,
and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
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would also have to take into account the dramatic wave of violence between
1914 and 1923, a wave of violence that had a much more immediate impact
on the protagonists of the Nazi war of extermination. Only this perspective
can explain why the countries that possessed the longest experience with colo-
nial violence were not identical with those states that developed the greatest
destructive potential after 1918.
It is also worth mentioning in this context that some historians who have pre-
viously focused on the effects of overseas colonialism on Europe have now
modified their question as to whether inner-European decolonization processes,
for example in the form of the dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman
Empires, or the detachment of territories belonging to the German and
Russian empires after 1918, can explain more about “recolonization” fantasies
than the distant memories of a short-lived German colonial empire in
Africa.70 Such inquiries, which can build on a growing literature on the “colo-
nial nature” of Germany’s Drang nach Osten before 1914, seem infinitely more
plausible than the abstract search for the Holocaust’s “African roots.”71
Hannah Arendt herself was keen to emphasize the crucial role of inner-Euro-
pean pan-movements in the destruction of traditional models of the nation-
state and the effects of territorial dissolution in 1917–18.72 Although frequently
quoted as the “mother” of the continuity thesis between Africa and Auschwitz,
Arendt was, in fact, quite explicit in her argument that the roots of Nazism were
not to be found in Africa: “The immediate predecessor of totalitarian imperial-
ism is not the British, Dutch, or French version of overseas colonial rule, but the
German, Austrian, and Russian version of a continental imperialism which
never actually succeeded, therefore is neglected by students of imperialism,
but which in the form of the so-called pan-movements—pan-Germanism and
pan-Slavism—was a very potent political force in central and eastern Europe.”73
An interpretation that emphasizes the common European patterns of colonial
violence, the discontinuities in German history between 1904 and 1941, and the
European colonial powers’dissimilar experiences in November 1918 may be less
provocative than the conceptualization of the Nazi war of extermination as a
70Dirk Moses, “Colonialism,” in The Oxford Handbook on the Holocaust, ed. Peter Hayes and John
Roth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
71Among the growing literature on this subject, see, for example, Phillip Ther, “Deutsche
Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte. Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kon-
tinentales Empire,” in Das Kaiserreich transnational, ed. Conrad and Osterhammel, 129–148. Gregor
Thum, ed., Traumland Osten. Deutsche Bilder vom o¨stlichen Europa im 20. Jahrhundert (Go¨ttingen: Van-
denhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Wolfgang Wippermann, Die Deutschen und der Osten. Feindbild und
Traumland (Darmstadt: Primus, 2007). Gerd Koenen, Der Russland-Komplex. Die Deutschen und der
Osten 1900–1945 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005).
72Ju¨rgen Osterhammel, “Imperien,” in Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien,
ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006),
56–67; Grosse, “From Colonialism to National Socialism to Postcolonialism,” 35–52.
73Arendt, Origins, 37.
HANNAH ARENDT’S GHOSTS 299
“colonial conflict”—the culmination point of a genocidal path that originated
in Africa and ended in Auschwitz. Compared to the construction of direct
continuities between the German colonial wars of 1904–1907 and Auschwitz,
however, such an interpretation would have an important advantage: the
advantage of being empirically sound.
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